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1. Introduction 
Over the past five to seven years, most international aid donors have started to pay 
attention to so-called ‘fragile states’. Generally, the interest in state fragility was 
spurred by security considerations in the wake of the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’. 
Fragile states came to be seen as a potential incubator of state collapse, which would 
result in the creation of ‘ungoverned spaces’, where crime and terrorism would 
develop (François and Sud 2006: 145).  
Overall, the focus on fragility is part of a more general trend of ‘securitisation of 
development’, which is preoccupied with creating conditions for stability in the 
developing world. As Duffield (2001: 310) has argued, ‘stability is achieved by 
activities designed to reduce poverty, satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic 
sustainability, create representative civil institutions, protect the vulnerable and 
promote human rights’. The reconstruction of ‘fragile states’ is the latest witness to 
the securitisation of development. 
The European Union has been no exception to the general trend of addressing 
fragile states, although it took the Union roughly four years to translate the concerns 
about ‘state failure’ voiced in the European Security Strategy of 2003 into a policy on 
fragile states (Council of the European Union 2003, 2007). The linkage of the EU’s 
policy on fragile states to security concerns has led to an emphasis of a wide set of 
policy instruments that make an explicit link among development, humanitarian, 
military and security aspects – sometimes referred to as a ‘whole-of-EU approach’ 
(European Commission 2007b: 7). Within this framework, the governance dimension 
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is emphasised – indeed, as will be argued in section 3 of this paper, the EU defines 
fragile states largely in terms of weak governance structures – but the way in which 
the agenda regarding those fragile states is implemented has strong security overtones 
(cf. Youngs 2008: 435). 
After having emphasised more formal and technical aspects of governance since 
the mid-1990s (the era of the so-called post-Washington Consensus), various 
international aid agencies have recently started to emphasise the need for more 
profoundly political or political-economic analyses of the governance situation in aid-
receiving countries (cf. Hout 2009; Hydén 2006). In a report on the ‘lessons learnt’ of 
its involvement in ‘low income countries under stress’ (LICUS), the World Bank 
stressed already in 2005 the desirability of performing ‘political economy and conflict 
analysis’ when selecting and sequencing priorities for the rebuilding of fragile states 
(World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services 2005: 8). This position was 
reinforced by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2006: 21), which 
emphasised the need for ‘commissioning and consuming’ good political analysis 
regarding countries where the Bank is actively involved. 
In those instances where the European Union has incorporated governance issues 
into its strategies for fragile states, its approach to governance has a highly 
technocratic character, with a strong emphasis on public sector reform and public 
finance. This approach, the paper will argue, is in stark contrast with the increasing 
awareness in the donor community of the political-economic dimensions of 
governance reforms. In particular, the EU’s failure to take cognisance of the lessons 
formulated by the World Bank on the application of political-economy and conflict 
analysis is highly surprising. 
 This paper presents an analysis of recently adopted EU policies on fragile states. 
The next section gives an overview of diverging interpretations of fragile states, and 
discusses some general observations on policies towards fragile states. Section 3 
discusses the concept of fragile states as applied in the EU context. Section 4 analyses 
the governance approach that has been adopted by the European Commission for use 
in developing countries in general, and discusses the way in which this approach is 
used for fragile states. Section 5 provides an analysis of several Country Strategy 
Papers that were drawn up for fragile states in the context of the 10th European 
Development Fund (2008-13), and specifically the way in which concerns regarding 
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governance rehabilitation have been entered into these documents. The final section 
of the paper presents some general conclusions. 
 
2. Fragile states: Definitions and Approaches 
Many authors have noted that the literature on fragile states has produced a wealth of 
definitions of state fragility. As observed by the World Bank (World Bank Operations 
Policy and Country Services 2005: 1), the term fragile states has gradually replaced 
concepts that were applied earlier – such as difficult partnerships, countries at risk, 
difficult environments, failing states and low income countrie under stress (LICUS) – 
since the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005. 
 Despite the widespread use of the concept, a recent review of ‘thinking and 
practice’ concerning fragile states has noted that there is no single, ‘unambiguous’ 
definition (Cammack et al. 2006: 18). The survey argues that definitions can be 
grouped on the basis of a limited number of characteristics. The three types of 
definitions distinguished by Cammack et al. (2006: 16-8) focus on, respectively: 
 
• state functions: definitions of this type understand fragile states in terms of the lack 
of capacity or will to perform certain functions that contribute to the security and 
wellbeing of a country’s citizens;1  
• state outputs: this type of definitions sees fragile states as bringing about a host of 
problems, including poverty, violent conflict, terrorism, global security threats, 
refugees, organised crime, epidemic diseases and environmental degradation; such  
problems may cause difficulties in neighbouring countries or across a whole 
region;2 
• relationships with donors: this category of definitions understands fragile states in 
terms of the difficult relationship they have with a particular donor or group of 
donors. These definitions imply that fragility is seen to result from ‘factors that 
                                               
1
 Milliken and Krause (2002: 763) have pointed out that many of the states that gained independence 
after the Second World War conceptualised as ‘pseudo-states’ rather than real states and that ‘the 
puzzle is not how and why they may fail, but how and why they exist or persist at all’. Their perceptive 
analysis leads to the conclusion that such states may never have been very effective in the performance 
of central state functions. Although very relevant for a thorough political understanding of the 
dynamics of fragile states, this line of analysis is not taken up in the current paper as its focus is on 
donor policies rather than political processes in recipient states. 
2
 The World Bank (2005: 27) has estimated that countries bordering on fragile states face a reduction of 
their gross domestic product of 1.6 per cent per year on average as a result of the spillover of such 
problems. 
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have more to do with the relationship (e.g. a particular shared history) than with 
the nature of the state itself’ (Cammack et al. 2006: 17). 
 
The main elements of the fragile state agenda implemented by international aid 
donors, according to Cammack et al. (2006: 25-6), revolve around three key 
objectives: the promotion of human security, basic needs and peace by providing 
humanitarian aid and peacebuilding; the furthering of development and improvement 
of governance; and the provision of global security. Underlying this variety of 
objectives, some commentators have argued (e.g. Van der Borgh 2008: 3), is a focus 
on the inadequate functioning of the state, and most remedies consequently revolve 
around the strengthening of government institutions.  
 Most policy-related definitions of fragile states can be classified in terms of one of 
the three categories mentioned above, as their focus is, understandably, on specific 
instances of state fragility that agencies wish to address. For instance, the definition 
applied by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee falls squarely within the 
first of Cammack et al.’s categories. According to the OECD/DAC, ‘[s]tates are 
fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic 
functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security 
and human rights of their populations’ (OECD 2007: 7). The World Bank’s 
understanding of state fragility, which is laid out into two aspects, straddles the first 
and second categories of Cammack et al.’s classification. The first aspect that is 
mentioned by the World Bank focuses on the weakness of state policies and 
institutions; this is felt to reduce seriously the state’s capacity to deliver services, 
control corruption and provide sufficient voice and accountability. The second aspect 
concerns the increased risk of countries to experience conflict and political instability 
(World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services 2005: 1). 
 Despite the desire in policy-making circles to develop clear-cut models of state 
fragility and differentiate fragile from stable developing countries, several important 
caveats have been formulated with regard to the implementation of policies on fragile 
states. The OECD/DAC has pointed out that state fragility in not an either-or issue, 
but rather a ‘spectrum …. found in all but the most developed and institutionalised 
states’ (OECD 2008: 12). This notion links to a wider set of factors, most or all of 
which highlight the need for a political response to fragility. According to the 
OECD/DAC, the understanding of fragility as a range instead of a single condition 
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leads to a focus on resilience (‘the ability to cope with changes in capacity, 
effectiveness, or legitimacy’) rather than stability as the opposite of fragility: 
‘Resilience, we argue, therefore derives from a combination of capacity and 
resources, effective institutions and legitimacy, all of which are underpinned by 
political processes that mediate state-society relations and expectations’ (OECD 2008: 
12). 
 The emphasis of the political nature of the response to fragile states has brought 
both the OECD/DAC and the World Bank to call for context-specific action. The first 
of the ‘Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations’, 
drafted in early 2005 and adopted by Development Ministers and Heads of Agencies 
in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in April 2007, emphasises the 
need to differentiate whether problems derive from a lack of capacity, political  
will or legitimacy. Moreover, the principles point out that policies on fragile states 
need to be tailored to the dynamics of the countries concerned. In line with similar 
conclusions reached earlier by the World Bank (2005: 13), the OECD argued that it is 
crucially important to recognise whether countries are going through a phase of 
political transition, are in a situation of deteriorating or rather improving governance, 
or have become locked into a political impasse (OECD 2007: 6).  
 In a discussion of its experience with the LICUS framework, the World Bank 
argued that the implementation of institutional reform in fragile states should 
recognise local dynamics instead of adopting a one-size-fits-all approach: 
In most fragile state contexts, developing technical suggestions for institutional 
reform is easy; managing the political process of reform is much more difficult. It 
is therefore important that institution-building initiatives avoid purely technocratic 
approaches, devoting considerable attention to the process of decision-making and 
implementation, and to well-designed participation and widespread communication 
of reform initiatives. The ‘fit’ of institutional structures with local realities has also 
frequently been problematic in fragile states, due to ill-adapted colonial legacies or 
the imposition of inappropriate external models: remaining open to new ideas for 
locally-driven institutional reforms and supporting local debate and discussion on 
options is critical. (World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services 2005: 5) 
Among a host of other observations, the 2006 review of the LICUS framework by the 
Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group produced a set of conclusions about the need 
for the analysis of the political situation and the causes of conflict in fragile states. An 
incisive comment regarding one of the fragile states targeted by the Bank illustrates 
the need for internalisation of political analysis: 
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For example, the Interim Strategy in Papua New Guinea has a good discussion of 
the political system. It recognizes the problems of clan loyalties, political 
patronage, corruption, lack of capacity, and other factors, but the Strategy then 
goes on to disregard some of this vital knowledge and treat these issues as 
technical problems. (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006: 21) 
In particular, four types of political analysis seem relevant for policy-making on 
fragile states (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006: 97). Political risk 
analysis would produce an assessment of the likelihood of future instability in a 
fragile state, while structural analysis would enhance understanding of the weakness 
of the state as a result of structural (for instance, ethnically or religiously based) 
sources of conflict. The analysis of day-to-day politics would lead to more insight into 
the distribution of power at the national, regional and local level, and would provide a 
clue as to whether decentralisation policies are likely to succeed or not. The analysis 
of the history of reform in the country and in neighbouring countries would contribute 
to an understanding of which reform policies are likely to be accepted by the 
population and which stand more chance of being resisted. 
 This section has highlighted different understandings of the nature of fragile states 
and agendas to address the problems associated with such states. Moreover, the 
section has summarised some of the lessons drawn with regard to the political aspects 
of the response to fragile states. On the basis of the above, it seems safe to conclude 
that most understandings of fragile states revolve around the (mal)functioning of the 
state in developing countries as a result of limited capacity, the inability of institutions 
to deal with social and/or political tensions or the lack of state legitimacy. Analyses of 
the implementation of the policies on fragile states (by, for instance, the World Bank 
and OECD) point at the centrality of adopting political analyses of processes and 
events in developing countries in order to understand local specificities that are 
causing fragility. 
 
3. The EU and Fragile States 
The European Union has begun to place increasing emphasis on so-called ‘fragile 
states’ with the adoption of its ‘security strategy’, drafted by CFSP High 
Representative Javier Solana, in 2003 (Council of the European Union 2003). The key 
threats to Europe that were outlined in the strategy included ‘state failure’, which was 
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perceived both as a threat in itself and as a possible contributing factor toward other 
types of threats. 
 The European security strategy defined state failure as a ‘key threat’, because  
‘[b]ad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of 
accountability – and civil conflict corrode States from within. … Collapse of the 
State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. 
State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and 
adds to regional instability’. (Council of the European Union 2003: 4) 
The strategy argued that various instruments should be applied by the European 
Union, ranging from military force to diplomatic engagement, trade relations, 
development aid and humanitarian assistance. In relation to developing countries, the 
strategy argued that ‘[s]ecurity is the first condition for development’ (Council of the 
European Union 2003: 13). Further to this, the ‘European Consensus on 
Development’, agreed by the Council, Commission and European Parliament in 
December 2005, called for a ‘comprehensive prevention approach to state fragility, 
conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises’ (European Parliament, Council 
and Commission 2006: 14). 
 In 2003, the European Commission presented a framework on governance and 
development that distinguished several types of relations that would later be 
subsumed under the lable of ‘fragile states’: ‘difficult’ and ‘extremely difficult’ 
partnership and ‘post-conflict’ situations (European Commission 2006d: 8). Each of 
these relations, the Commission argued, would require different approaches. In the 
case of difficult partnerships, which are ‘characterised by a lack of commitment to 
good governance’ (European Commission 2003: 20), alternative approaches to 
cooperation would have to be found, including the provision of humanitarian aid, 
collaboration with NGOs and civil society organisations, and political initiatives at the 
international and regional level. In ‘extremely difficult partnerships’ the only option 
would be to suspend cooperation entirely (European Commission 2003: 21). Post-
conflict situations, where state institutions are either non-functioning or non-existent, 
would call for attempts at reconciliation between parties involved in the conflict, a 
process of relief, rehabilitation and development, and the provision of humanitarian 
aid. The aim of the approach would be to have the authorities address governance 
issues, which were seen to lie at the root of the conflict in many cases (European 
Commission 2003: 24).  
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  The Conclusions formulated by the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) in November 2007 (Council 2007) on the basis of the 
Commission’s Communication understood state fragility in reference to 
weak or failing structures and to situations where the social contract is broken due 
to the State’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its 
obligations and responsibilities regarding the rule of law, protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of its population, poverty 
reduction, service delivery, the transparent and equitable management of resources 
and access to power. (Council 2007: 2) 
The Commission’s Communication referred to fragility as a feature mainly of low and 
middle income countries that are faced with structural weaknesses of the economy, 
and are vulnerable to crises, external shocks, epidemics, drug trafficking, natural 
disasters, environmental degradation, and endangered cultural diversity (European 
Commission 2007d: 5). Governance deficits, however, were seen as the main cause of 
state fragility: ‘Fragility is often triggered by governance shortcomings and failures, 
in form of lack of political legitimacy compounded by very limited institutional 
capacities linked to poverty’ (European Commission 2007d: 8). 
 The Council Conclusions of November 2007 contained a long list of ‘issues’ that 
should be addressed in the EU’s approach of preventing and responding to state 
fragility. Apart from general issues such as attention for democratic governance, 
support of state capabilities and gender equality, the list included (Council 2007: 4-6): 
 
• the improvement of existing governance assessment tools; 
• the development of early warning mechanisms on democratic governance issues, 
rule of law, human rights, poverty levels and conflict; 
• the strengthening of the role of Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) as the preferred 
framework to prevent and address fragility; 
• the strengthening of allocation criteria in the various aid schemes applied by the 
European Community for both ACP and non-ACP countries; 
• the integration of democratic governance and institutional development into the so-
called LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development) framework; 
• the use of the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in 
order to channel more funds to developing countries that display signs of state 
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fragility and that would run the risk of being excluded from development 
assistance (so-called ‘aid orphans’). 
 
In order to start addressing the issue of state fragility at the level of European 
Community development policy, the Council requested the Commission to ‘test’ the 
EU response in pilot cases. Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Timor-Leste 
and Afghanistan were selected as pilot countries for this purpose (European 
Commission 2007c).3  
 
4. The EU and Governance 
 
4.1 Governance in the Country Strategy Papers 
As noted above, the European Community’s ‘response strategy’ to state fragility 
makes a distinction between cases of ‘extremely difficult’ and ‘difficult’ partnerships. 
In the former cases, there is considered to be little scope for governance-oriented 
strategies directed at national political authorities, and EC activities would normally 
be limited to: humanitarian assistance or food aid; linking relief, rehabilitation and 
development activities; support to civil society activities, for instance in support of 
human rights and governance reform; and political initiatives at the regional or 
international level. In the case of ‘difficult’ partnerships, the Commission envisages 
that governance and institutional capacity building support, along with support for 
human rights activities, would be feasible elements of its response strategy (European 
Commission 2006c: 2).  
 The main tool in the relationship between the European Community and partner 
developing countries is the Country Strategy Paper. As is the case with many 
international development agencies, the European Community formulates a medium-
term strategy for the provision of development assistance on the basis of a country’s 
official national policy priorities. The latter have usually been laid down in a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), required for support from World Bank and IMF. 
The European Commission argued that the establishment of a common framework for 
the formulation of CSPs ‘made a significant contribution to achieving the goal of 
                                               
3
 Apparently, these pilot countries were chosen under the Portuguese Presidency of the European 
Council, and this may explain why countries like Guinea-Bissau and Timor-Leste were included. Yet 
no formal statements on the selection process have been uncovered. 
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multiannual programming and to increasing the effectiveness and quality of the EU’s 
external aid (European Commission 2006b: 5). 
 As part of the ‘country diagnosis’, a Country Strategy Paper is required to contain 
an analysis of the political – along with the economic, social and environmental – 
situation in the partner country. An important set of governance indicators is included 
among the assessment of the political situation, such as (European Commission 
2006b: 12-14): 
 
• the main obstacles at the national level for the protection of and respect for human 
rights; 
• the observance of democratic principles, as related to elections and change of 
government; 
• the organisation of the government and decision-making procedures, including the 
division of power over different levels of government, transparency and 
accountability of key political institutions, measures countering corruption and 
other forms of economic criminality, and the rule of law and the independence of 
the judiciary; and 
• evidence pointing at state fragility, such as the incapacity to perform basic 
government functions (security, social services and human rights). 
 
In addition to these indicators, it was argued that  
in fragile states, post-conflict countries and specific cases of countries that have yet 
to achieve ‘structural stability’ or are showing signs of increasing instability, 
greater attention should be given to analysing measures taken to ensure security 
and stability, including conflict prevention and management, post-conflict 
intervention strategies (demobilisation, disarmament, re-integration (in particular 
of women and child soldiers), rebuilding, humanitarian mine clearance, support for 
action against illegal arms trafficking and dissemination of small arms and light 
weapons, etc.), and the introduction of the rule of law and democracy (including 
broader participation of civil society and a more equitable distribution of power). 
(European Commission 2006b: 14) 
 
4.2 The European Commission’s Governance Profile 
Accompanying the Communication on ‘Governance in the European Consensus’, the 
European Commission set up a methodology for assessing developing countries’  
governance quality. In the first instance the so-called ‘governance profile’ was 
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developed for ACP countries, but later releases of the profile have dropped the 
reference to only the ACP group. The profile was set up as a ‘programming tool’, the 
main objectives of which are ‘to help identifying specific areas of cooperation 
(weaknesses) and agreeing on benchmarks and targets for reform (Government 
commitments), or on sectoral performance indicators, if governance is a focal area’ 
(European Commission 2006d: 11). The governance profile was meant for application 
by the European Commission, and not to reflect necessarily a common understanding 
of governance quality in the recipient country: ‘The governance profile is not meant 
to be done necessarily jointly with the partner country but its content should be shared 
(but not negotiated and agreed) with partner country during the programming 
dialogue’ (European Commission 2006d: 11, italics added). 
 The governance profile developed by the European Commission consists of nine 
components, which are subdivided in a variety of specific issues. The profile is 
summarised in table 1. 
 
Table 1: The European Commission’s Governance Profile 
Components Items 
1. Political/democratic governance a. Human rights 
    (WBI’s Voice and accountability) b. Fundamental freedoms 
 c. Electoral process 
 d. Principles of constitutional democracy 
2. Political governance/rule of law: 
    Judicial and law enforcement system 
 
3. Control of corruption  
4. Government effectiveness a. Institutional capacity 
 b. Public finance management 
5. Economic governance (WBI’s  a. Private sector/market-friendly policies 
    Regulatory quality) b. Management of natural resources 
6. Internal and external security (WBI’s a. Internal stability/conflict 
    Political stability and absence of violence) b. External threats and global security 
7. Social governance  
8. International and regional context a. Regional integration 
 b. Involvement in regional initiatives on governance 
    and peer-review mechanisms (such as APRM) 
 c. Migration 
9. Quality of partnership a. Political dialogue 
 b. Programming dialogue 
 c. Non-state actors 
Source: European Commission 2006d: 13-29 
Note: WBI refers to the World Bank Institute’s Governance Matters indicators (Kaufmann et al. 1999) 
  
 The governance profile as used by the European Commission draws heavily on the 
work done by staff at the World Bank Institute, resulting in the Governance Matters 
indicators and dataset (Kaufmann et al. 1999). The first six components are based on 
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the six elements of the Governance Matters dataset. The final three indicators (on 
social governance, international and regional context, and quality of partnership) have 
been developed by staff at the Commission. Of the nine components, two 
(political/democratic governance and internal and external security) seem to address 
political issues of governance most directly, while two (internal and external security 
and international and regional context) appear to be most directly related to the 
problems faced by fragile states. Two components (political governance/rule of law 
and control of corruption) primarily assess the presence of legal instruments, while 
two (government effectiveness and economic governance) are essentially meant to 
scrutinise the management of economic policies and policy-making. The component 
on social governance relates to the implementation of a variety of social policies. The 
final component is geared to assessing the implementation of Community 
development projects and programmes. Also, the inclusion of an item on migration in 
the eighth component appears to be informed mainly by concerns in the European 
Union about possible immigration.4 
 Strikingly, the governance profile does not contain an assessment of the factors 
that are considered to be crucial variables in the production of state fragility: the 
legitimacy of institutions and office-holders, and the delivery of key public services. 
The profile considers mainly formal indicators of governance performance, and does 
not relate to major political issues in many developing countries, such as the exclusion 
of particular social groups, inequalities within the population, or the domination of the 
political system by the executive and the difficulty in mounting opposition against the 
ruling party. This bias has led Youngs (2008: 434) to critise the EU’s emphasis of ‘the 
capacity and procedural efficiency of the state’, rather than ‘democratic plurality’. 
 
5. Governance-Oriented Responses to State Fragility: Analysis of Country 
Strategy Papers 
This section contains an analysis of governance-oriented responses in several of the 
‘pilot’ countries selected by the European Commission: Afghanistan, Burundi, 
                                               
4
 The Communication on ‘Governance in the European Consensus’ announced the introduction of an 
incentive reserve related to countries’ governance plans, amounting to €2.7 billion out of the €22.6 
billion allocated to the 10th EDF. The incentive reserve would be distributed with the use of the 
governance profile on the basis of ‘the assessment of the [governance] situation and the reform 
commitments given in the dialogue’ (European Commission 2006a: 12). In a recent paper Molenaers 
and Nijs (2008) indicate that the governance incentive has, so far, amounted to little more than a formal 
exercise. 
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Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.5 The analysis is performed on the 
basis of the Country Strategy Papers that have been concluded by European 
Community and the countries concerned in the context of either the Development 
Cooperation Instrument (for non-ACP countries) or the 10th European Development 
Fund for the period between 2008 and 2013 (for ACP countries). 
 
5.1 Afghanistan 
Afghanistan has been a target country for support from the European Community 
since the 1980s, while EC support was stepped up in the Country Strategy Paper 
2003-6 that had been concluded after the removal of the Taliban regime as part of the 
‘war on terror’ declared by former US President Bush. The CSP 2003-6 was oriented 
to reconstruction, in particular of infrastructure and basic government institutions 
(European Commission 2007a: 3). 
 Allocations as part of the DCI 2007-13 demonstrate that Afghanistan has clearly 
obtained priority in EC policy-making. The EC has allocated around €1.03 billion to 
Afghanistan for the 2007-13 period (European Commission 2007a: 4), which amounts 
to roughly 6.1 per cent of the funds available in the DCI during this period (European 
Parliament and Council 2006: 64). Priority areas for EC support are threefold (rural 
development, governance and health), while other activities (such as reform of the 
security sector and education) are left to other donors (European Commission 2007a: 
17-9). 
 The CSP 2007-13 for Afghanistan contains an analysis that points at some deep-
rooted problems threatening the country’s political system. In particular, the political 
analysis addresses: 
 
• the risk of state capture by groups involved in narcotics trade, which is the 
country’s major source of income;  
• the country’s fragile security situation as a result of the insurgency of the Taliban 
and other armed groups;  
• the political division of the country along ethnic lines and the strong and conflict-
prone centre-periphery divide; and  
• the poor human rights situation (European Commission 2007a: 7). 
                                               
5
 No CSP was available for Haiti. 
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 As part of the CSP’s focus on governance, the EC’s ‘response strategy’ contains 
two priorities: the rule of law, in particular the reconstruction of the justice sector, and 
public administration reform. The emphasis on the reconstruction of the justice sector 
is linked to the desire to enhance the effectiveness of counter-narcotics policies. In 
addition, the recruitment of judges and prosecutors is seen as an important element in 
the strengthening of the rule of law in Afghanistan (European Commission 2007a: 22-
3). 
 Public administration reform in Afghanistan would be focused on two main 
targets: democratisation and improvement of local governance, and strengthening of 
financial management and accountabiliy. The first of these components relates to the 
organisation of regular elections for local and regional bodies and the enhancement of 
the capacity of local administration to deliver basic services, for instance, by training 
young civil servants. The second element concerns the development of capacity for 
revenue collection by customs and tax authorities and the fight against corruption 
(European Commission 2007a: 23-4). 
  
5.2 Burundi 
In the framework of the 10th EDF, Burundi has been allocated €188 million as so-
called A allocation under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement for macroeconomic 
support, sectoral policies and for programmes and projects in support of focal and 
non-focal areas of Community assistance. The country will be receiving another €24.1 
million as B allocation for unforeseen needs, such as emergency aid, debt relief and 
support to mitigate instability of export earnings (République de Burundi – 
Communauté européenne 2007, hereafter referred to as Burundi CSP 2007). 
 The analysis of the political and institutional situation in Burundi in the CSP points 
at the continuing violation of human rights and the rule of law despite the ‘political 
will’ to make improvements in both respects. The failure to bring an end to the armed 
struggle between the government and the rebel Hutu party is ascribed to the lack of 
experience and capacity of the armed forces and the police (Burundi CSP 2007: 3). 
The constitutional guarantees for ethnic and religious diversity, adopted in 2005, and 
power-sharing arrangements in state institutions and state-owned enterprises are 
judged to have improved the relations between the rivalling ethnic groups (Hutus and 
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Tutsis).6 The democratic process is still felt to be fragile; further democratic 
consolidation is seen to require better cooperation between the majority party, the 
other political parties and civil society (Burundi CSP 2007: 3-4). 
 Burundi’s Strategic Growth and Poverty Reduction Framework (Cadre stratégique 
de croissance et de lutte contre la pauvreté, CSLP), adopted in 2006, contains four 
central ‘axes’, among which improvement of governance and security was considered 
a ‘sine qua non’ for national reconciliation and economic development  (Burundi CSP 
2007: 10). The main activities relate to the security sector, such as: general and 
permanent cease-fire; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of 
former combattants; professionalisation of the security forces; and disarmament of the 
population. Further, strengthening of the rule of law and the fight against impunity are 
mentioned as central to the strengthening of governance (Burundi CSP 2007: 11). 
 The CSP for 2008-13 notes that various measures on good governance that had 
formed part of the previous CSP (for 2003-7) concluded between Burundi and the 
European Community had not been implemented until Feburary 2007. The €19.75 
million involved will be allocated to strengthening the central and local legal system, 
public sector management, and decentralisation of public administration (Burundi 
CSP 2007: 14). 
 In the CSP 2008-13, rural development and health are chosen as the concentration 
areas for EC support. Good governance issues, most notably public finance 
management, are mentioned as a component of the programmes to be implemented in 
each of these areas, as well as for budget support (Burundi CSP 2007: 20-1). 
Governance-oriented projects and programmes, which are included in the non-focal 
areas of the CSP, will receive an allocation of €10 million during the 10th EDF. These 
funds are meant for (Burundi CSP 2007: 22): 
• state reform with an eye to issues of justice, decentralisation, civil service, security, 
and land and infrastructure; 
• reinforcement of control mechanisms such as the national auditor’s office, 
anticorruption services and inspection services; 
• bringing in line national legislation with international human rights norms; 
                                               
6
 The CSP does not refer to other than ethnic and religious causes for the tensions between the Hutus 
and Tutsis. This is in contrast to analyses of deeper structural political-economic causes of the conflict, 
related to the unequal distribution of and access to resources, which have been mentioned in the 
literature on Burundi (cf. Jooma 2005). 
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• support to decentralisation policies; and 
• cofinancing of the next elections. 
 
5.3 Guinea-Bissau 
The CSP agreed between the European Community and Guinea-Bissau for the 2008-
13 period resulted in an allocation of almost €103 million to the country. The A 
allocation of €100 million contains an allocation of €27 million for programmes 
aimed at strengthening the rule of law and democracy (République de Guinée-Bissau 
– Communauté européenne 2007: 36, further Guinea Bissau CSP). 
 The political and institutional analysis of Guinea-Bissau points at the country’s 
history of political violence and coups d’état. The causes of the political problems, 
according to the CSP, are diverse, and include the country’s weak economic basis, its 
lack of social cohesion produced by ethnic cleavages, and the recent military conflict 
(Guinea-Bissau CSP 2007: 29).7 The CSP considers the national elections of 2004 and 
2005 as steps on the way to a normal constitutional and political situation, despite the 
fact that political stability has remained fragile as a result of tensions between the 
president and the parliamentary majority (Guinea-Bissau CSP 2007: 5). Moreover, the 
CSP notes that civilian control over the armed forces and the presence of arms among 
the population remain problematic, and necessitate reform of the security sector 
(Guinea-Bissau CSP 2007: 6). 
The CSP argues that Guinea-Bissau’s public administration structures, in particular 
public control institutions, are weak. The low degrees of transparency in resource 
management and public finance are seen as serious issues, as weaknesses in these 
areas lead to corruption, fraud, money laundering and tax evasion. As the legal 
framework is weak, the population has insufficient access to justice and the business 
environment is unfavourable (Guinea-Bissau CSP 2007: 6-7). 
Guinea-Bissau’s poverty reduction strategy for 2006-8 (Documento de Estratégia 
Nacional para a Redução de Pobreza, DENARP) contains a focus on strengthening  
governance, modernising public administration and improving macroeconomic 
                                               
7
 Magalhães Ferreira (2004: 54) adds several ‘structural conditions’ to these causes, brought about by 
the country’s unequal distribution of wealth and the grip on the country’s resources by the political 
group in power, which rules by maintaining profound clientelist networks. The structural conditions 
mentioned by Magalhães Ferreira include poor and inefficient governance, profound divisions within 
the political elite and the military, incapacity of public institutions to provide basic social services, 
corruption, poverty and dependence on foreign aid. 
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stability, along with promoting economic growth, improving access to social services 
and basic infrastructure, and improving the living conditions of vulnerable groups 
(Guinea-Bissau CSP 2007: 19). The CSP 2008-13 emphasises, in particular, measures 
to support the rule of law and democracy, aimed at the consolidation of central state 
organs, public sector reform and reform of the security sector, including reintegration 
of former soldiers. These activities receive 90 per cent of the €27 available for this 
domain. Next to this, support of the National Authorising Officer and electoral 
support involve another €3 million (Guinea-Bissau CSP 2007: 37-8). A further 
amount of €32 million in budget support is meant for economic stabilisation, and 
should assist Guinea-Bissau on the way to establishing ‘good economic governance’ 
and public finance management (Guinea-Bissau CSP 2007: 31). 
 
5.4 Sierra Leone 
Under the 10th EDF, Sierra Leone received an allocation of €242 million in the A 
envelope and an additional €26.4 in the B envelope. Approximately 15 per cent of the 
A envelope will be spent on good governance and institutional support (Sierra Leone 
– European Community 2007, Part 2: 1, further Sierra Leone CSP). 
 The CSP’s analysis of the political situation focuses on the impact of the civil war, 
which lasted from 1991 until 2002, destroyed the country’s infrastructure and political 
institutions, and led to a massive outflow of refugees to neighbouring countries. The 
roots of the civil war are traced to the centralisation of power, the absence of 
accountability in the co-opted civil service and widespread corruption (Sierra Leone 
CSP 2007: 5-6). The EU’s assessment is that the country ‘remains an extremely 
“fragile state”, with a poorly resourced civil service that lacks capacity, operated 
inefficiently and lacks even the basic facilities to deliver adequate services’ (Sierra 
Leone CSP 2007: 6).8 
 Despite the fact that national and local elections were held since 2002, the CSP 
concludes that Sierra Leone is lacking democratic and effective governance, and 
effective oversight mechanisms (such as Parliament and the judiciary). Regionalism 
and locality are important in the country, and political allegiance, according to the 
                                               
8
 Keen (2004: 289-96) points at the deep-rooted causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone, which are 
related to the underdevelopment of the country’s economy and the pervasiveness of social exclusion. In 
his view, the lack of education, unemployment and failure of local justice produced grievances among 
all participants in the Sierra Leone conflict, and the violence that swept the country in the 1990s can be 
explained largely in terms of group efforts to draw attention to these grievances. 
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CSP, is based in social networks that are tied to particular places. The danger of 
internal instability is assessed to be real (CSP 2007: 6-7). 
 The Joint Response Strategy, set up by the EC and the UK, is aimed at governance, 
peace and security; the promotion of pro-poor growth; and basic service delivery and 
human development. Measures that are suggested to support good governance and 
institutional reform are: 
• the strengthening of democratic institutions by improving the country’s capacity 
for holding free and fair elections and by giving assistance to the electoral process, 
including voter and civic education, political registration and awareness-raising; 
• support of the decentralisation process (a first phase focusing on finalisation of the 
legal framework and capacity-building in financial management, procurement and 
human resources, and a second phase of capacity-building aimed at the 
management structures of decentralised sectors and services); 
• support of civil service reform, aimed at restructuring and ‘right-sizing’, and 
capacity-building within the civil service for the implementation of the country’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy; and 
• support for a variety of actors in the public sector and for civil society (Sierra 
Leone CSP 2007, part 2: 3-4). 
 
5.5 Timor-Leste 
In 2007, Timor-Leste received an allocation of approximately €64 million as part of 
the 10th EDF multi-annual agreements, €63 million of which is assigned in the 
country’s A envelope (Timor-Leste – European Community 2007: 2, further Timor-
Leste CSP). 
 Timor-Leste’s CSP stresses that the country’s road to independence was rather 
violent, with Indonesian military forces attempting to maintain the country’s grip on 
East Timor. After independence in 1999, there were several periods of violent unrest, 
most recently in 2006. Causes for the 2006 crisis included the resurfacing of divisions 
that predated 1999 – in particular the failure to do justice in view of the crimes 
preceding independence – and poverty among youth and urban population, resulting 
in a legitimacy crisis of the government. Although peaceful elections were held in 
2007, several sources of instability persist, such as the presence of many weapons 
among the civilian population, the vast number of displaced persons and the 
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widespread discontent among members of the security forces.  (Timor-Leste CSP 
2007: 9-12). 
 Under the 9th EDF, a CSP was agreed in 2006 for support to rural development 
and institutional capacity-building. The latter priority led to a focus on the 
development of a trade policy, support for electoral processes and the electoral 
system, and institutional capacity-building in the area of public finance management 
(Timor-Leste CSP 2007: 23). 
 The EC’s assistance under the 10th EDF aims to support the government’s 
National Development Plan in three areas: rural development, health and institutional 
capacity-building (Timor-Leste CSP 2007: 70). Institutional capacity-building, which 
is supported with €13 million, or 21 per cent of the means provided in the CSP, 
focused on five main activities: 
• support of the judiciary, such as the training of judges and lawyers and capacity-
building of various courts; 
• improvement of the capacity and performance of the civil service and support for 
decentralisation processes; 
• strengthening of the institutional capacities of the national Parliament; 
• support of communication media, with the aim of enhancing understanding and 
providing information within institutions and with the population; and 
• support to the National Authorising Officer to improve implementation of EC 
programmes in Timor-Leste (Timor-Leste CSP 2007: 75-6).  
Apart from assistance for these activities, the CSP contains support for non-state 
actors and for governance-related joint initiatives with Portuguese-speaking African 
countries (Timor-Leste CSP 2007: 77). 
 
5.6 CSPs and the EC Response to Fragile States 
The discussion of the Country Strategy Papers agreed by the European Commission 
with various fragile states has illustrated some of the challenges inherent in the 
formulating of a strategy to deal with state fragility. As all CSPs follow the same 
format, it has been possible to compare the political(-economic) analyses that are 
underlying the EC’s approach to the different fragile states, as well as the main 
components of the EC’s response strategy for these countries. 
 20 
 The analyses of the political-economic situation in the five cases described in 
sections 5.1 to 5.5 illustrate the resolve of the European Commission to ground its 
response strategy in an understanding of the local dynamics of the countries 
concerned. From a methodological point of view, one could question the transparency 
and reliability of the analyses, which do not provide an insight into the sources on the 
basis of which judgements are made, and have apparently not involved independent 
analysts from outside the Commission. The Commission’s account of political-
economic problems in the countries concerned demonstrate, however, the wish to 
present a substantively sound and policy-relevant comprehension of the main causes 
of state fragility. In three cases (Burundi, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone), it was 
argued, with reference to some independent accounts, that the Commission’s analyses 
did not seem to dig deep enough to uncover the structural or root causes of the 
problems experienced by the countries concerned. Yet, despite this criticism, it is 
clear that the Commission’s analyses reflect a general agreement about the 
manifestation of the problems in the five fragile states. 
 The content of the response strategies for the fragile states shows, however, a 
profound gap between the political-economic analyses and the measures adopted in 
the EC’s support packages. The various measures are compared in table 2. 
 
Table 2: EC Support Strategies in Five Fragile States 
 Afghanistan Burundi Guinea-Bissau Sierra Leone Timor-Leste 
Public sector 
reform 
x x x x x 
Decentralisation x x  x x 
Public finance 
management 
x x x  x 
Electoral 
support 
 x x x  
Security sector 
reform 
 x x   
Support/reform 
of justice sector 
x    x 
Support of 
Parliament and 
central state 
organs 
  x  x 
Anti-corruption  x    
Civil society 
support 
   x  
Sources: European Commission 2007a: 22-4; Burundi CSP 2007: 20-2; Guinea-Bissau CSP 2007: 31-
8; Sierra Leone CSP 2007, part 2: 3-4; Timor-Leste CSP 2007: 70-7 
 
 21 
Table 2 illustrates the dominance of certain types of responses to the problems in 
fragile states: public sector reform, decentralisation and public finance management 
are key to the EC’s approach in all cases analysed above. Also, support of electoral 
processes at the national or local level shows up as a measure in a majority of the 
fragile states studied. Security sector reform, support of the justice sector and support 
of central state organs are each mentioned in the case of two of the five fragile states. 
Finally, anti-corruption and civil society support show up in one case. 
 The listing of priority areas in table 2 makes it clear that the general approach of 
the European Commission is to assist in reconstructing state capacities in fragile 
states through essentially technical and managerial measures. In a good number of the 
cases analysed in this paper, such technocratic measures do not seem to square with 
the analysis of the problems made either in the CSPs or by independent analysts. 
Issues raised in the analyses of state fragility relate to problems of state capture, 
including patronage and clientelism, violent resistance of groups against central 
government, ethnic divisions, human rights violations, weak socio-economic basis, 
and extreme inqualities and social exclusion or marginalisation of particular groups. 
The failure to address the fundamental problems underlying state fragility raises 
serious questions about the effectiveness of the EC’s policy on fragile states. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has tried to make sense of the current focus, within the European Union, 
on the issue of state fragility. The paper has argued that the EU’s concern with the 
issue has had strong security overtones, and that the EU response fits in with the 
overall trend of securitisation of development. The choice of countries for inclusion in 
fragile state framework seems to reflect the central role played by security 
considerations, but the paucity of data at this moment do not permit more than a 
provisional answer. In this context, Briscoe has made an important observation that 
may serve as a hyporthesis for further research. He argued that the choices made in 
Europe and North America on fragile states have been informed by ‘the significant 
role played by many of the world’s most fragile states in supplying to the developed 
world energy and raw materials, producing and trafficking drugs, purchasing arms, 
generating off-shore capital, or serving as significant outposts in the “war on terror”’ 
(Briscoe 2008: 9). 
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 The EU’s approach to fragile states has tended to concentrate on the governance 
dimensions of the problems in the countries concerned: the definition of state fragility 
that was adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council in November 
2007 reflects this focus. The EU’s understanding, discussed in section 3 of the paper, 
is that state fragility implies a breakdown of the social contract due to a state’s failure 
to perform its major functions, including the provision of the rule of law, security, 
poverty reduction, service delivery and resource management. 
 As was argued in section 2 of the paper, the recent discussion on governance and 
fragile states in policy-making circles has produced several lessons for external actors. 
In particular, assessments of earlier interventions have led organisations such as the 
World Bank and the OECD to emphasise context-specific action, based on throrough 
knowledge of the local situation, and the need for a political analysis of processes and 
events spurring state fragility. The EU’s approach to governance and state fragility 
does not seem to pay sufficient attention to these insights. The EU’s methodology on 
assessing governance, as reflected in the recently adopted ‘governance profile’ 
(section 4.2), emphasises formal indicators of governance quality and pays 
insufficient attention to salient political or political-economic issues, such as social 
exclusion, inequality and state capture. Moreover, the analysis of various Country 
Strategy Papers in section 5 has illustrated that the European Commission’s ‘response 
strategies’ for the pilot fragile states show quite some disparity between the 
understanding of local political-economic dynamics and the measures adopted to 
support the fragile states. In particular, the CSPs focus on the reconstruction of state 
capacities dominantly by technical and managerial means that overlook more 
fundamental political-economic problems in the countries concerned. 
 It seems safe to conclude that the EC’s approach to reconstructing fragile states 
reflects the view, discussed in section 2, that the real problem of these countries lies in 
the inadequate functioning of the state, i.e., inadequate when looked at from prevalent 
Western conceptions of the ‘modern’ state. This approach overlooks the fact that the 
state is essentially an institution that is embedded in local social, political and 
economic realities, and that the way in which the state functions (or not) needs to be 
understood in terms of specific social, political or economic interests. In this respect, 
the analysis made by Chabal and Daloz in relation to the African state is very 
pertinent. These authors have argued that judgements on the ‘failure’ of the state in 
Africa are essentially a function of the Weberian approach to the state. The 
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dominance of the ‘fundamentally instrumental concept of power’ has given rise to the 
‘informalisation of politics’ and the ‘instrumentalisation’ of the state (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999: 4). The question, therefore, is not so much whether the fragile state 
‘works’, but rather for whom it works. Attempts to reconstruct fragile states need to be 
grounded in an understanding of the political-economic realities of the countries 
concerned, in particular of the incentives, challenges and opportunities faced by 
various actors (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007: 44). Policies that do not take account 
of the local political economy of fragile states are bound to fail. 
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